Uber used a disruptive business model driven by digital technology to trigger a ride-sharing revolution. The institutional sources of the company's platform ecosystem architecture were analyzed to explain this revolutionary change.
Introduction
The dramatic advancement of information and communication technology (ICT) in recent years has brought about a new reality in which information, people, organizations, logistics, and finance are constantly connected on a global level and mutually influence one another. This constant connection is starting to produce a hitherto non-existent synergy without being bound to the confines of existing industrial structure and technology fields. Therefore, the synergy allows the creation of new businesses and markets, and is also starting to change how we work and live (Council of Science, Technology and Innovation, 2016) [9] .
Uber, an on-demand ridesharing service that connects passengers to local drivers in real time using smartphone technology, demonstrates this ICT-driven disruptive business model by triggering a ride-sharing revolution.
In light of its conspicuous accomplishment, to date, considerable studies have been undertaken in elucidating, conceptualizing and operationalizing Uber's system success. The studies can be classified into five streams: (i) prospect of automotive industry, (ii) ridesharing revolution, (iii) disruptive innovation, (iv) ICT-driven innovation, and (v) new business model. Schlze et al. (2015) [24] pointed out that automotive firms cope with turbulence caused by globalization, new government regulations, and advances in electronics, communication, and drive train technologies. In the mean time, these technologies are facilitating not only new product features but also new business models which Uber deployed as consumer preferences move toward mobility as a service rather than vehicles as products. They stressed the significance of a wide lens (Adner, 2012) [1] with change and stability. Avital et al. (2014) [2] stressed that an economy based on the exchange of capital, assets and services between individuals has grown significantly, spurred by the proliferation of Internet-based platforms that allow people to share underutilized resources and trade with reasonable transaction costs. The movement to the ride-sharing revolution triggered by Uber was also postulated by Blk (2014) [5] , Koopeman et al. (2014) [17] , King (2015) [16] and Ehret (2015) [11] . Ehret referred Rifkin's "Zero marginal cost society" (Rifkin, 2014) [23] and suggested un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2016) [36] that Uber may emerge by stressing that "Soon we will have access to most products and services at almost no marginal cost. Mega-corporation will cease to make profits and the capitalist market economy will be replaced by a collaborative commons, where people exchange ideas and support each other with creative solutions."
This emerging paradigm is disruptive to the conventional company-driven economic paradigm as evidenced by a large number of peer-to-peer based services (Avital et al., 2014) [2] on which Uber is based. Isaac et al. (2014) [15] appreciated Uber as one of the most disruptive, successful tech start-up company which has severely disrupted the taxi service industry. They pointed out that much of the success Uber has generated so quickly relies on (i) its ability to classify itself as a "technology company" instead of a transportation company, (ii) the ability to classify their drivers as independent contractors instead of employees, and (iii) a depressed market in which workers are willing to assume the burden of risks and costs associated with driving for the company. They pointed that much of the reason why Uber has been so threating to the traditional taxi industry lay in its efficient and innovative utilization of modern technology, particularly ICT. Baiyere et al. (2015) [4] supported this view by stressing that rapid continuous advancement in ICT corresponds to the emergence of M A N U S C R I P T A C C E P T E D ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT 3 disruptive ICT innovation increases. Horpedahl (2015) [14] highlighted smartphone apps are stressing that they allow consumers to bypass traditional taxicabs. All led to a new business model. Cohen et al. (2014) [7] reminded that some altogether new and different business has emerged over the several past years. These developments have started to challenge traditional thinking about how resources can and should be offered and consumed. This way of thinking supports the arguments that incremental improvements in our existing production and consumption systems are insufficient to transform our global economy toward sustainability (Lovins et al., 2011 [18] , Stead et al., 2013 [26] ). From these, a new business model inevitably emerges toward the shared economy. Cohen et al. (2014) [7] pointed out that shared mobility solutions can be attributed to multiple agents, including public and private providers, seek to develop business models which address deficiencies in public infrastructure and public transit systems, historically the exclusive purview of local and regional governments. They also warned that the common interest in sustainability among these different types of agents does not always lead to harmony, instead giving rise to agency conflicts that can reduce the positive sustainability impact of their individual and collective initiatives. Indeed, Uber has been confronting legal battles with the traditional automotive industry, particularly the taxi industry in some countries.
All the preceding streams intertwine with each other leading to a new system design or systems web. Uber's system success and ICT-driven disruptive business model, on which Uber is based, can be attributed to a co-evolution of this systems web. However, scholars have yet to undertake an analysis of a co-evolution of a systems web which connects these new streams.
Inspired by noting the contrast between the world's leading ICT countries with respect to happiness/welfare amidst great stagnation in Finland and conspicuous economic growth in Singapore, authors have demonstrated that current ICT-driven global development depends on a trend shifting from traditional co-evolution of computer-initiated ICT, captured GDP, and economic functionality to new co-evolution of the Internet, un-captured GDP, and suprafunctionality beyond economic value. The authors then demonstrated that the above contrast can be attributed to the difference between the two states in the shifting trends described above (Watanabe et al., 2016) [36] . This paper elucidates and conceptualizes Uber's system success based on Uber's contrasting disruptive innovation development trajectory and contrasts the ICT-driven disruptive business model with the traditional taxi industry based on a traditional business model. An empirical analysis similar to the analysis done on the co-evolution of three megatrends governing the difference of the state in the shifting trends was conducted. Section 2 reviews Uber's conspicuous start-up. Section 3 analyzes institutional enablers creating platform ecosystems. Section 4 demonstrates co-evolution of three mega-trends leading to sharing economy. Section 5 briefly summarizes noteworthy findings, implications, and suggestions for future works.
Uber, Its Conspicuous Start-up 2.1 Digital Technology Driven Disruptive Business Model
Ride-sharing company Uber is a high-tech company founded in March 2009 ( Table 1) . It is seen as the jewel of ICT as it brilliantly connects the transportation industry with ICT via its ride-sharing application and it leverages the sharing revolution (Belk, 2014) [5] , leading to the transformation of the market for taxi cabs and limousines. It offers its service in over 375 cities worldwide in 2015 ( Figs. 1a, 1b ). Uber is regarded as the highest-valued venturesupported company. It is currently one of the fastest growing start-ups worldwide. It's value exceeds the value of the full US taxi and limousine industry.
Uber gives passengers a better service with cost and time savings in reaching a location, and it provides its drivers with a highly efficient operation without additional investment and license fees ( Table 2) . Its system is convenient also for drivers. They can work flexible hours and can reject unwanted clients. Through a cashless system based on credit cards, Uber can trace and choose highly-rated drivers. Reliance on digital technology provides passengers with a transparent view of quality and prices. Similarly, drivers can memorize passenger's behavior. Thus, Uber has established a mutual rating system among the company, drivers, and passengers.
In this way, Uber has triggered a disruptive business model which is driven by digital technology. This technology has been significantly impacting traditional business, not only in transportation but also almost all business institutions.
Uber appraised itself for this business model as "Uber epitomizes disruption. The company has changed the way we think about grabbing a ride, incorporating the same technology we take for granted today into a brand new experience for consumers and an opportunity for producers" (A Brief History of Uber) [29] . 
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Astounding Rise
As a general consequence of the numerical analysis of newly emerged innovation, elucidation of Uber's systems success was a challenge in exploring the dark continent without published statistical data. Fig. 2 attempts to trace the trajectory of Uber's astounding rise. Conspicuousness of Uber's disruptive business model can be confirmed by the astounding rise in the number of its users. Based on expense reports from business travelers, Certify (2015) [6] revealed that an average 46% of all total paid car rides were through Uber in major markets across the US in March 2015. This demonstrates a steep rise particular in business use over the 14 months from a mere 15% in January 2014 as demonstrated in Fig. 2 .
Uber's fast rise to success directly correlates with the decrease in the number of traditional taxi users. The share of taxi, limousine and shuttles of that number fell dramatically from 85% to 54% over this 14 months. This observation is rather biased towards Uber, as the report is focused on business travelers, it has been estimated that the number of people using Uber is higher than the number of people using a taxi now (Frier, 2015) [12] . As a consequence of Uber's astounding rise in a co-existing development trajectory with taxis, the number of trips in taxis demonstrates rapid decline ( Fig. 3-1 ) which resulted in their revenues decline ( Fig. 3 -2) and subsequent increase in their prices ( Fig. 3-3 ). 
Trend in the Substitution for Taxi
Institutional Enablers Leveraging Uber's Astounding Rise
Sharing Economy for Physical Products
Uber's astounding rise can largely be attributed to dissemination of sharing economy from digital products to physical products.
In line with people's preferences shift from economic functionality to supra-functionality beyond economic value (Watanabe et al., 2014 [34] ), sharing economy in physical products (i.e., rooms and cars) has been gaining momentum.
The underlining paradigm of the original sharing economy is that users aim at increasing resource-use efficiency, to lower costs or to create new value. Online trading platforms such as Napster and eMula were amongst the first to provide users with shared access to digital music and videos. It was possible to download these digital products from lenders on the platform for free, and uploading and downloading happened simultaneously (Winterhalter et al., 2015 [35] ).
People's preference shift to supra-functionality has led to requests for a similar platform also for physical products. People wish to use such products (which were provided passively, primarily with economic functionality) in a more sophisticated manner by their initiative (Adner, 2012 [1] ).
Sharing economy for physical products initiated by Uber and AirbnB is needed by the market with such underlining paradigm.
Institutional Enabler of Sharing Economy in Physical Products
(1) Advancement of ICT
The main enablers of the sharing economy are ICT and Internet connectivity, which allow effective peer-to-peer contact (The Economist, 2013 [28] ).
Thanks to the dramatic advancement of the Internet, countless websites connect people on a peer-to-peer basis with separate resources of almost any kind (not only time, digital information and knowledge resources but also space and fixed assets) to the needs of others searching for these resources.
Such advancement, particularly of a smartphone, nurtures Uber by enabling high qualified services with lower cost 2 and shorter time. Fig. 6 demonstrates a trend in smartphone share in the US mobile subscriber market over the period July 2013 -September 2015. Looking at Fig. 6 we note that while smartphone has gained popularity, and its share in the mobile subscriber market demonstrated a sharp increase in the US, there has been stagnation in the upward surge and a shift from quantity to quality in 2015 in nationwide in the US (comScore, 2013-2015 [8] ). (Jul. 2013 -Sep. 2015 .
Fig. 6. The trend in Smartphone Share in the US Mobile Subscriber Market
Smartphone share of the US mobile subscriber market: % of mobile subscribers aged 13+ owning a smartphone. Source: comScore (2013-2015) [8] .
(2) Passengers Initiative and Paradigm Shift to Ecosystem
Passengers initiative also strengthens, while the company's systematic market strategy brings benefits such as continuous reductions in costs and time for search and matching while eliminating information asymmetries and compiling a massive database.
Uber compiles a massive database on driver and rider behavior, which is essential to Uber price-setting and market-making. Also, it allows Uber and the regulators to ensure safety and to root out discrimination against passengers.
In addition to the introduction of the Internet, the paradigm shift from resources to ecosystem (from captured GDP to un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2014 (Watanabe et al., , 2015 ) has been leveraged by Uber in its creation of a new business. Shifting from traditional inhouse-oriented business towards services making use of interactions between the stakeholders: company, drivers, and passengers.
Under the support of these institutional enablers, Uber was able to accomplish astounding rise by the following simple business model: (i) Its smartphone-based app connects drivers, offering rides and passengers seeking them, (ii) Passengers pay mileage-based fees through credit cards that company keeps on file, and (iii) Uber takes a percentage of each fee and gives the rest to its driver.
Self-propagating Virtuous Cycle (1) Governing Factors of Uber Prices Decline
Since Uber prices (PU) are governed by the increase in smartphones demonstrated by its share in the mobile subscriber market (SP), learning and economy of scale effects, their trend can be depicted as follows: Table 3 demonstrates that while SP elasticity to P U maintains negative with smaller value in the 3 rd period, learning co-efficient changed from negative to positive in the 2 nd period and changed again to negative in the 3 rd period. The former corresponds to the observation in Utilizing the results of Table 3 , the contribution of Uber prices decrease can be identified as summarized in Table 4 . Looking at Table 4 we note that Uber's prices have been governed by the increase in its trips and own strategy together with the increase in smartphones. Contribution of trips increase can be attributed to learning and economy of scale effects ( As analyzed in Fig. 5 , sharp decline in Uber prices stagnated from August 2004 and changed to upward trend by serious complaints about unexpectedly high charges due to surge pricing in October 2014. While this upward shifting factor remains, the price decline trend was maintained by introducing Uber Go in November 2014 together with technology advancement effort. This challenge in the 3 rd period demonstrated high elasticity of trips to prices and compensated the stagnation of smartphones share increase in 2015. Upward trend in the 2 nd period can be attributed to surge pricing strategy. Table 4 demonstrates these rise and fall trends. Noteworthy is a resilient recovery in price decline in the 3 rd period despite stagnation of smartphones contribution to this decline. This suggests a sophisticated dynamism in Uber's ICT-driven trips and prices coordination which is beyond simple ICT's self-propagating function as well as learning and economy of scale effect.
(2) Virtuous Cycle between Uber Trips Increase and Its Prices Decline
Inspired by the foregoing suggestion, Fig. 7 analyzes the correlation between Uber's trips and their prices in NYC over the same period. Table 4 . While Uber's prices demonstrated sharp decline as smartphones increased in the 1 st period, after recovering from the upward trend in the 2 nd period, prices decline was maintained under trips increase initiative despite smartphones direct effect decreased. This dynamism prompts us the sources of Uber's success leading to its astounding rise as reviewed earlier. Given Uber as the jewel of ICT as reviewed in 2.1, this success is considered to depend on ICT's unique comprehensive function beyond simple self-propagation, learning and economy of scale effects.
Co-evolution of 3 Mega-trends Leading to a Spinoff to Sharing Economy
Emergence of Un-captured GDP (1) Medallion Prices as a Proxy of the Trend in Taxi Demand
The medallion system (official taxi licenses with medallion, in place since 1937) sets an upper limit of the number of those cabs with licenses. As the demand grew, medallions became more and more valuable, resulting in higher medallions prices. Therefore, the trend in medallion prices can be considered as a proxy of a trend in taxi demand 3 and given its sustainable increase, Taxi medallions were considered the best investment in the US (Badger, 2014) [3] .
Thus, this trend continuously increased, experiencing logistic growth as demonstrated in Table 5 . This trend led to a sharp hike in medallion prices from 250 thousand US$ in January 2004 to a peak of 1.3 million US$ (for the corporate sector) in June 2013, as demonstrated in Fig. 8 . Table 5 Estimates of Medallion Prices for the Period preceding their Stagnation (Jan. 2004 -Jun. 2013 Y: Medallion prices, N: Carrying capacity, t: Monthly trend, a, b: Coefficients All t-values demonstrate statistically significant at the 1% level. 3 Medallion prices demonstrate significant correlation with taxi trips as follows and support this view: 
Correlation between Taxi Trips (T T ) and the Medallion Prices (MP) in NYC
(2) Correlation between Dependency on Uber and Medallion Prices
The more cabs are booked through Uber, the less money the cab drivers make and the worse the taxi medallions look like as an investment. Medallion prices have continued to drop considerably after Uber, with prices declining, caught up with the price level of a traditional taxi in May 2014. (Jun. 2013 .6 -Sep. 2015 .
Fig. 9. Correlation between Dependency on Uber and Medallion Prices in NYC
Sources: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission (TLC) and Certify [6] . Uber's astounding success brought its prices lower than a taxi in May 2014 ( Fig. 5 ). Uber's success resulted in a significant decrease in medallion prices (Fig. 8 ). Reduced madallion prices (taxi demand decrease) induce further dependency on Uber, leading to a virtuous cycle between medallion prices decline and increase in this dependency, as demonstrated in Fig. 10 This demonstrates a structural source of the contrast between precipitous fall of the medallion prices and astounding rise of Uber.
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(3) Two-faced Nature of ICT and Subsequent Un-captured GDP
The impacts of Uber's sharing revolution on the medallion system in NYC can be classified into two periods:
During the first two years after the launch of Uber in May 2011, Uber's share remained below 10% (Fig. 2) , and its impact on medallion prices was limited. The medallion prices continued to increase, due primarily to the increase in demand for a taxi. (ii) However, after this "pregnancy period," once Uber's share reached 10% in June 2013 overcoming the Chasm in a diffusion trajectory (Moore, 1999 [22] ), 4 the M A N U S C R I P T
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sharing revolution made a structural change to the medallion price formation system, leading to the above-mentioned precipitous fall. Table 5 suggests that without such sharing revolution which made a structural change in the price formation system, the medallion prices may continue to logistic growth as illustrated in Fig. 8 by a broken line. Contrast of actual and estimated medallion prices corresponds to the two-faced nature of ICT which postulates that while the advancement of ICT contributes to enhancing its prices by increasing new functionality development, dramatic advancement of the Internet tends to decrease ICT prices due to freebies, easy copying, and mass standardization, among other things as illustrated in Fig. 11 (Cowen, 2011 [10] ). This suggests the emergence of un-captured GDP as Uber advances. Advancement of ICT can largely be attributed to the dramatic advancement of the Internet, which has changed the computer-initiated ICT world significantly. The Internet promotes a free culture, consumption of which provides utility and happiness to people but cannot be captured through GDP data that measure revenue (Lowrey, 2011 [19] ) leading to increasing dependency on un-captured GDP (Watanabe et al., 2014 (Watanabe et al., , 2015 ).
Uber's better service with cost and time savings for passengers by highly efficient operation without additional investment and license fees for drivers correspond to this concept. Therefore, discrepancy between actual medallion prices and estimated medallion prices without Uber in Fig. 8 can be considered as demonstrating the magnitude of uncaptured GDP (See Appendix 2).
PI
Un-captured GDP
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Inspired by the preceding observation with respect to emergence of un-captured GDP driven by the discrepancy induced by Uber, un-captured GDP emerged by Uber can be captured by measuring the discrepancy between taxi prices and magnitude of their decline effect derived from Uber as illustrated in Fig. 12:   Fig. 12 . Scheme of the Measurement of the Emergence of Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber in NYC. Fig. 12 demonstrates the significant parallel correlation between taxi prices (P T ) and estimated medallion prices without Uber (Mpe), as well as aggregated prices (P A ) and actual medallion prices (MP) (See Appendix 3) . This endorses the view that the balance between taxi prices and aggregated prices represents the emergence of un-captured GDP emerged by Uber.
where PT: Taxi prices, PU: Uber prices, PA: Aggregated prices, TT: Taxi trip, UT: Uber trip, α: UT/TT ratio. 
Emergence of Uber-Driven Un-captured GDP (1) Substance of the Uber-driven Un-captured GDP
Supported by the preceding endorsement, Fig. 13 demonstrates the magnitude of uncacaptured GDP per trip emerged by Uber. The substance of this un-captured GDP can be summed up as follows:
High-qualified services with lower cost and shorter time. An increasing initiative of passengers and the company's systematic market strategy of continuous reduction of costs and time in search and matching, eliminating information asymmetries and compiling a massive database. Fig. 13 demonstrates that while Uber nurtured "negative un-captured GDP value" (its services were unable to catch up with those of taxi accumulated over the last 120 years) by June 2014, it succeeded in nurturing increasing un-captured GDP from the beginning of 2015 corresponding to its success in sustainable decline in prices from the end of 2014 ( Fig. 5 ). 
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Spinoff to Sharing Economy (1) New Functionality Development During Diffusion Process
Uber's conspicuous virtuous cycle between prices decline, and increased trips can largely be attributed to its self-propagating function incorporating new functionality development during its diffusion process as was prompted by the analysis in Fig. 7 .
Diffusion trajectory of innovative goods Y (trips of taxis and Uber in this case) can be depicted by the following epidemic function:
where N: carrying capacity (sealing the adoption of innovative goods) and a: coefficients governing diffusion velocity.
This equation leads to the following simple logistic growth (SLG) function:
where b: coefficient indicating initial state of the diffusion.
While the level of carrying capacity is assumed constant through the diffusion process in this function, in particular innovations, the correlation of the interaction between innovation and institutions displays a systematic change in the process of growth and maturity. This leads to the creation of a new carrying capacity in the process of its diffusion similar to equation (1) as follows:
This equation leads to the following logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) function, which demonstrates the level of carrying capacity enhancement as the diffusion proceeds (Meyer et al., 1999 [21] ):
where Nk: ultimate carrying capacity, and ak and bk: coefficients similar to a and b. Equation (4) demonstrates that the 3 rd term of the denomination governs the dynamic carrying capacity and without this term results in SLG with a constant carrying capacity. 
(2) Uber's Self-propagating Function
From equation (3), dynamic carrying capacity can be expressed as follows:
This demonstrates that N(t) increases together with the increase of Y(t), and its growth rate as time goes by. This implies that the LGDCC function demonstrates functionality development in the context of the self-propagating behavior (Watanabe et al. (2004) [30] , [32] ). Uber (Jun.2013 -Sep.2015 119.27 (41.41) 0.121 (36.67) 49.650 (11.13) 0.016 
0.999
Taxi: based on medallion prices (Fig. 8 ), Uber: based on trips ( Fig. 4 ) with spline interpolation (see Appendix 4).
LGDCC: Logistic growth with dynamic carrying capacity, Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except * 3 : 5 %, * 5 : 15 %, x : nonsignificant. Table 6 demonstrates that while taxis depend on SLG as its 3 rd term of the denomination (a k and b k ) demonstrates statistically insignificant, Uber demonstrates depending on LGDCC with statistically significant 3 rd term of the denomination.
This demonstrate that Uber has developed with the self-propagating function.
(3) Spinoff from Taxi to Uber
This self-propagating function plays a vital role of the engine in spinning-off from traditional co-evolutional three mega-trends to new co-evolution as illustrated in Fig. 15 . This spin-off plays significant role in inducing ICT-driven innovation (Watanabe et al. (2015 (Watanabe et al. ( , 2016 [35, 36] ). Here spin-off is defined as jumping to more sophisticated co-evolutional dynamism from traditional co-evolutional dynamism in inducing innovation (Watanabe et al., 2011 [33] ).
From equation (5) 
This equation demonstrates that functionality development can be accelerated as its growth rate increases. Since functionality development plays a locomotive role in leveraging spin-off (Watanabe et al. (2011) [33] ), equation (6) indicates self-propagating function leverages spin-off by inducing functionality development.
Fig. 15. Scheme of Spin-off Dynamism.
This spin-off can be observed in industries not only transportation ( Fig. 16) but also music industry, game industry and printing and publishing industry. Nowadays, even education industry has been behaving the similar trend. 
Digitalization of taxi industry
In Jan. 2016 the Uber has expanded to 375 cities worldwide.
Ride on demand service E-hailing and payment service via mobile phone App
Uber is cheaper than other taxies in US. 
Paradigm change
Dynamism of Uber's ICT Driven Disruptive Business Model
By the preceding analyses, the dynamism of Uber's ICT driven disruptive business model can be identified as illustrated in Fig. 17.   Fig. 17 
. The dynamism of Uber's ICT Driven Disruptive Business Model.
Co-existing development trajectory with taxi corresponds to two-faced nature of ICT that is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP.
This emergence can be attributed to a strong substitution from taxi to Uber accelerated by contrasting vicious cycle between price increase and trips decrease in taxi and a virtuous cycle between price decline and trips increase in Uber.
Uber's virtuous cycle can be attributed to ICT's self-propagating function that enhances the level of functionality as its diffusion proceeds.
This self-propagating function plays a vital role in spin-offs from traditional co-evolution to new co-evolution between ICT advancement, paradigm change to increasing un-captured GDP dependence, and people's preferences shift to supra-functionality beyond economic value.
This spin-off accelerates further lower cost and higher services, which accelerates the foregoing virtuous cycle.
Uber's success can be attributed to constructing such ICT driven disruptive business model.
Business models have been moving from pipes to platforms and we are in the midst of transformative shift in business design. Platforms allow participants to co-create and exchange value with each other. External developers can extend platform functionality and contribute back to the infrastructure of the business. Pltform users who act as producers can create value on the platform for other users to consume. All have been demonstrated by Uber.
Uber's disructive business model can be thus appreciated as a leader of transformative shift in business design by constructing the foregoing platform ecosystem.
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Conclusion
Secret of the Uber's System Success
In light of the disruptive digital-technology-driven business model that Uber has used to trigger a ride-sharing revolution, the institutional sources of the company's platform ecosystem architecture were analyzed.
Aiming at elucidating institutional enablers creating Uber's platform ecosystem, an empirical analysis of its co-existing development trajectory with taxi was attempted.
Noteworthy findings include:
(i) This co-existing development trajectory corresponds to two-faced nature of ICT that is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP, (ii) This emergence can be attributed to a strong substitution from taxi to Uber accelerated by contrasting vicious cycle between price increase and trips decrease in taxi and a virtuous cycle between price decline and trips increase in Uber, (iii) Uber's virtuous cycle can be attributed to ICT's self-propagating function that enhances the level of functionality as its diffusion proceeds, (iv) This self-propagating function plays a vital role in spin-offs from traditional coevolution to new co-evolution between ICT advancement, paradigm change to increasing un-captured GDP dependence, and people's preferences shift to suprafunctionality beyond economic value,
(v) This spin-off accelerates further lower cost and higher services, which accelerates the foregoing virtuous cycle, and (vi) Uber's success can be attributed to constructing such ICT driven disruptive business model.
Noteworthy Elements Essential to Well-Functioning Platform Ecosystem Architecture
These findings form the base for the following suggestions supportive to constructing a well-functioning platform ecosystems:
(i) Penetrate the current demand and challenge to meet it (e.g., sharing economy, saturation of taxi business, popularity of smartphone), (ii) Fully utilize the advancement of ICT, particularly of the Internet (e.g., smartphone, digital payment, big data analysis), (iii) Construct a co-evolution between sophisticated platform ecosystems and consolidation of broad stakeholders (e.g., mutual rating system among company, its drivers, and their passengers), (iv) Take care of the platform orchestration for efficiency, development and innovation (e.g., successive innovation for novel services as competitor like Lyft boosting and also as against movement emerging), (v) Thereby, creating a novel business model which has never been conceived before.
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Implications of Un-captured GDP
The emergence of un-captured GDP emerged by Uber can be attributed to:
(i) People's preferences shift to sharing economy and advancement of ICT, particularly of the Internet and subsequent smartphones, (ii) Better services, with cost and time saving for passengers, high efficient operation without additional investment and licenses fees for drivers, and optimal price-setting and market making beyond marginal cost for company through a massive database on driver and passenger behavior, and (iii) The paradigm shift from resources to the ecosystem that corresponds to the shift from captured GDP to un-captured GDP.
Thus, Uber's un-captured GDP can be considered as a consequence of the co-evolution between people's preferences shift, advancement of ICT and this paradigm shift.
This co-evolution has been leveraged Uber to create new business, to create services through interactions between stakeholders: company, drivers, and passengers.
All this can be attributed to systems success: platform ecosystem architecture under the contemporary digital economy.
Criticism to be Solved
However, as a consequence of the transition to this new dynamism, there remain the following areas of criticism:
(i) Business philosophy for discrimination (e.g., equivalence of services for remote areas with low population density), (ii) Safety issues, (iii) Treatment of privacy issues, and (iv) Compliance with labor standards.
Given the noted contrast between co-evolutionary success with institutional systems in host countries/cities and legal battles with quite a few countries/cities through Uber's global expansion, thesources of this contention as a a consequence of business strategy, platform ecosystems design, and institutional systems in host country/city should be further studied.
Future Works
This analysis has explored a prototype of the analysis of the ICT-driven disruptive business model using the analysis of the co-evolution of three mega-trends that nurtures uncaptured GDP.
Furthermore, analyses applying this approach is expected to be undertaken for similar disruptive business models in the (i) music industry, (ii) electronic gaming industry, (iii) printing and publishing industry, and (iv) education. In addition, business areas as fintech, legal and real estate should also be explored.
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Appendix 1. Data Construction
As a consequence of the numerical analysis of newly emerged innovation, elucidation of Uber's systems success was a challenge in exploring the dark continent without published statistical data. Therefore, the challenge started from constructing series of reliable statistical data which can be summarized as follows. A sensitive analysis of the estimated data was conducted to ensure the reliability of constructed data, (Appendix 4). (2013/6 -2015/9 ). Data were constructed by cross evaluating earlier work listed on the right-hand side and data/information by TLC and Uber. Supplemental estimate of the missing periods of the above estimates was based primarily on the spline functions illustrated above. The trend in medallion prices as a consequence of co-existing diffusion trajectory of a taxi with prices increase and that of Uber with prices decrease suggests that this trajectory is subject to the two-faced nature of ICT that is behind the emergence of un-captured GDP.
Fig. A1. Estimate of Supplemental Period
Source: NYC Taxi and Limousine Commission.
Fig. A2. Trend in Corporate Medallion Prices in NYC
and Contributors (2004) (2005) (2006) (2007) (2008) (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) (2015) . In case of a co-existing diffusion of taxis and Uber, J and I correspond to UT (Uber trips) and TT (taxi trips) and Eq. (A2) can be represented as Table A1 . 
Where N (carrying capacity) = 2247, (Table 5) This demonstrates that coexistence of taxi and Uber is subject to two-faced nature of ICT.
(2) Diffusion Coefficient
Coefficients governing modified bi-logistic growth in Eq. (A1) can be identified as follows (here J and I correspond to UT and TT): Table A1 can be demonstrated as follows: This demonstrates that contrary to taxis prices increase as their trips increase, Uber prices decrease as its trips increase leading a virtuous cycle for Uber. All this support the analysis of institutional sources being behind the emergence of un-captured GDP. 
A2.3 Prospect of Un-captured GDP Nurtured by Uber
As reviewed in Fig. 8 , the magnitude of un-captured GDP can be measured by the balance between actual medallion prices and medallion prices without Uber.
While the former can be estimated by Eq. A6, the latter can be estimated by Table A2 . Table A2 demonstrates how the trend in medallion prices without Uber can be estimated both by logistic growth and parabolic growth. The latter provides a higher estimate. 
A2-4 Timing when Uber Overcame Chasm
Chasm is a deep trench compelling new ventures start-up (Moore, 1991) [22] .
It's timing in the logistic growth diffusion trajectory can be depicted as follows (Watanabe et al., 2011) [33] :
where logistic growth diffusion trajectory is:
In case of the following logistic growth within a dynamic carrying capacity (LGDCC) diffusion trajectory, a and b in the above equation can be approximated as follows [31] :
Provided that Uber has been developing in line with the LGDCC diffusion trajectory as demonstrated in Table 6 in NYC from its launching in May 2011 (t = 1), t in eq A10 can be t = 21.5 (March 2013).
This demonstrates that Uber has overcome the Chasm at the timing just before its share reached 10% in June 2013. Similarly, Fig. A9 illustrates the correlation between taxi prices (PT) and medallion prices without Uber (MPe) over the period May 2014-September 2015.
PT vs. MPe and PA vs. MP demonstrates significant parallel correlation as far as 2015 is concerned and supports the significance of un-captured GDP measurement depending on the balance between PT and PA during the above period. 
A4.1 Estimate without and with Spline Interpolation
In analyzing Uber diffusion trajectory (4.3 (1) and (2)), given the sensitive impacts of fluctuation on the trajectory formation within the limited samples, a comparative analysis was attempted by comparing Uber trips estimate with and without spline interpolation as shown in Fig. A10 and Table A4 . The function used for the spline interpolation was based on the logistic growth function (Appendix 1). (Jun. 2013 -Sep. 2015 .
Fig. A10. Comparison of Uber Trips Estimate
UT: Uber trips estimated by taxis trips and Uber dependency (Appendix 1) UT2: Uber 
A4.2 Effects of the Estimates of Uber-Driven Un-captured GDP (1) Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber
Sensitivity analysis of the effects of the estimated data was conducted by comparing the effects of un-captured GDP measurement as demonstrated in Fig. A11 . The result demonstrates no substantial differences between estimates with and without spline interpolation.
Fig. A11. Trends in Taxi Prices and Aggregated Prices in NYC (Jun. 2013 -Sep. 2015).
Aggregated prices PA are measured by the following equation:
(2) Increase in the Emergence of Un-captured GDP Emerged by Uber
Similarly, no substantial differences in an increase in the emergence of un-captured GDP between estimated data with and without spline interpolation were confirmed as demonstrated in Fig. A12 . 
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A4.3 Effects of Uber's Development Trajectory Estimate
While Uber's development trajectory, estimated using trips trend, without spline interpolationdemonstrates the slight possibility of self-propagation by the LGDCC. Spline interpolation demonstrates explicit self-propagation by demonstrating the significance of the LGDCC.
While this difference does not have any significant effects on aggregated prices and uncaptured GDP estimates, the effects on self-propagation can be attributed to a slightly higher pace (1-9%) of trips estimate after March 2015. This suggests that an optimal and not too rapid development pace seems essential for incorporating the self-propagating function. 
0.999
Taxi: based on medallion prices (Fig. 8 ), Uber: based on trips ( Fig. 4 ) without spline interpolation (U T ) and with spline interpolation (U T2 ) (See Table A4 ).
LGDCC: Logistic growth with dynamic carrying capacity, Figures in parenthesis indicate t-statistics: all significant at the 1% level except * 3 : 5 %, * 5 : 15 %, * 6 : 20 %, x : non-significant.
(eq. (4)). 
